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Deferring to the pronounced legislative 
intent, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Kansas v. Hendricks, 
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), allowed 
the state discretion in defining 
statutory terms that have legal 
significance. In a five to four 
decision, the Court concluded that 
Kansas' civil commitment statute 
aimed at sexually violent 
predators satisfied substantive 
due process requirements. 
Relying on the non-punitive nature 
of civil law, the Court further held 
that the statute did not violate 
constitutional prohibitions against 
double jeopardy or ex post facto 
lawmaking. 
In 1994, Kansas enacted the 
Sexually Violent Predator Act 
("Act"). The Act was designed to 
target repeat sexual offenders 
who did not fall within the scope of 
the existing civil commitment 
statute. Leroy Hendricks 
("Hendricks") was the first person 
Kansas attempted to commit 
under the new Act. Hendricks had 
a long history of sexual offenses, 
including his most recent 
conviction of taking "indecent 
liberties" with two thirteen-year-old 
boys. He had served nearly ten 
years of his sentence and was 
due to be released to a halfway 
house when Kansas filed a 
petition to commit him as a 
sexually violent predator. At trial, 
the jury found that Hendricks' 
diagnosis as a pedo-phile qualified 
as a "mental abnormality" under 
the Act. As a result, Hendricks 
was committed to the custody of 
the Secretary of Social and 
Rehabilitation Services until his 
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pedophilia no longer presented a 
threat to society. Hendricks 
appealed claiming the Act violated 
the Due Process, Double 
Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto 
Clauses of the United States 
Constitution. 
The Kansas Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of Hendricks on his 
due process claim but did not 
address his double jeopardy or ex 
post facto claims. Kansas 
petitioned for certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court and 
Hendricks filed a cross petition to 
reassert his double jeopardy and 
ex post facto claims. The Court 
granted certiorari on both petitions 
and reversed the lower court's 
ruling that there was a due 
process violation. 
The Court began its analysis 
by emphasizing that an 
individual's constitutionally pro-
tected right against physical 
restraint can be overridden in civil 
proceedings by the state. Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 
2079 (1997). Additionally, the 
Court asserted that states have 
historically provided for civil 
detention of citizens whose 
behavior posed a threat to public 
safety. 'd. at 2079 (citing 1788 
N.Y. Laws, ch. 31). Involuntary 
commitment statutes have 
. consistently been upheld where 
they provide certain procedural 
and evidentiary standards. 'd. at 
2080 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992». 
The Court acknowledged that 
civil' commitment statutes have 
been sustained against consti-
tutional challenges when the 
statutes required proof of a 
person's dangerousness and 
mental illness. 'd. at 2080 (citing 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-
315 (1993); Allen v. Illinois, 478 
U.S. 364,366 (1986». The Court 
believed that this substantive due 
process standard was met by the 
Act in question. 'd. First, the Act 
requires a finding that the 
individual is dangerous to himself 
or others before commitment can 
take place. 'd. at 2080. This 
condition of dangerousness is 
satisfied if the person "has been 
convicted of or charged with a 
sexually violent offense." 'd. 
(citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-
29(a)(02)(a) (1994». Second, the 
Act requires a finding of "mental 
abnormality" or "personality 
disorder" that makes it impossible 
for the individual to control his 
behavior. Id. at 2080 (citing Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 59-29(a)(02)(b) 
(1994». The Court felt that the 
Act sufficiently narrowed the class 
of individuals to those who are 
truly dangerous because of their 
mental condition. 'd. 
Hendricks claimed the mental 
disorders that would lead to 
commitment under the Act were 
not equivalent to a "mental 
illness," and therefore, his sub-
stantive due process rights were 
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violated. 'd. The standard used 
under most involuntary commit-
ment statutes, including Kansas' 
existing statute, is "mental illness" 
not "mental abnormality." 'd. 
However, the Court refused to 
distinguish between the two terms, 
asserting that states traditionally 
have been charged with defining 
medical terms that have legal 
significance. 'd. at 2081 (citing 
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 
354, 365, n.13 (1983». The Act 
defines a "mental abnormality" as 
a "condition . . . which pre-
disposes the person to commit 
sexually violent offenses." 'd. at 
2077 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-
29(a)(02)(b) (1994». The Court 
found no substantive due process 
violation in Kansas' choice of the 
term "mental abnormality" in the 
statute, and reaffirmed the jury's 
finding that Hendricks' diagnosis 
as a pedophile qualified as a 
mental abnormality under the Act. 
'd. at 2081. 
Next, the Court addressed 
Hendricks' cross petition claims. 
Hendricks argued that the Act 
established criminal proceedings 
and that its effect was to institute 
punishment. 'd. He asserted the 
civil commitment proceeding was 
based on past conduct for which 
he had already been punished 
and was, therefore, in violation of 
the double jeopardy and ex post 
facto clauses of the Constitution. 
'd. The Court, unpersuaded by 
Hendricks' argument, found that 
the Act did not establish criminal 
proceedings. 'd. 
The Court proclaimed that a 
determination of whether a 
proceeding is civil or criminal is a 
matter of statutory construction. 
'd. at 2081 (quoting Allen, 478 
U.S. at 368). The Court then 
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examined the history of the Act in 
order to ascertain whether the 
legislature intended the Act to be 
a civil proceeding. 'd. at 2082. 
The Court relied on two facts in 
determining the legislative intent: 
(1) the placement of the Act in the 
probate code as opposed to the 
criminal code; and (2) the 
description of the Act by the 
legislature as creating a civil 
commitment procedure. Id. The 
Court explained that the stated 
legislative intent should be 
overridden only when clear proof 
exists that the scheme of the 
statute is punitive either in 
purpose or effect. 'd. (citing 
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242, 248-249 (1980». 
Evidence of a punitive purpose 
would exist if the Act furthered the 
main objectives of criminal laws. 
'd. The Court articulated that the 
two primary objectives of criminal 
laws are retribution and 
deterrence and that the Act did 
not further either objective. 'd. 
The Act was found not to be 
retributive because it only 
considered prior criminal conduct 
as evidence to show that the 
individual had the requisite 
"mental abnormality." 'd. 
Additionally, the Act did not 
function as a deterrent because 
the individuals committed have a 
"mental abnormality" that, by 
definition, prevents them from 
exercising any degree of control 
over their behavior. 'd. Because 
of their mental condition, the 
threat of confinement was not a 
deterrent. 'd. 
Hendricks proposed other 
arguments tending to prove the 
Act was punitive, but each was 
similarly dismissed by the Court. 
Hendricks claimed that the use of 
procedures under the Act normally 
found in criminal trials indicated 
that the Act was criminal not civil. 
Id. at 2083. In rejecting the 
argument, the Court stated that 
Kansas' decision "to provide some 
of the safeguards applicable to 
criminal trials cannot itself turn 
these proceedings into criminal 
prosecutions." 'd. (quoting Allen, 
478 U.S. at 372). 
Hendricks also argued that the 
Act was punitive because it did not 
offer any legitimate treatment. Id. 
at 2083. In order for this 
argument to prevail, the Court 
stated' that treatment for 
Hendricks' condition would have to 
have been available but failed to 
be provided by the state. Id. 
Additionally, if no treatment was 
available for a particular condition, 
this fact would still not be sufficient 
evidence to deem the Act punitive. 
'd. The Court has "never held 
that the Constitution prevents a 
State from civilly detaining those 
for whom no treatment is 
available, but who nonetheless 
pose a danger to others." Id. 
The Court did not find 
sufficient proof of a punitive 
purpose or effect to override the 
stated legislative intent that the 
Act was a civil proceeding. Id. at 
2085. Because a finding that the 
Act was punitive was a 
prerequisite to the application of 
the double jeopardy and ex post 
facto clauses, the C'ourt dismissed 
these claims. 
The dissent, however, urged 
that there was sufficient proof to 
show a punitive purpose. Id. at 
2092. For previously convicted 
offenders like Hendricks, the Act 
deferred the diagnosis that would 
have led to treatment until 
immediately prior to the scheduled 
release from prison. Id. at 2093. 
The dissent believed that the 
delay of treatment and the failure 
to consider less restrictive 
alternatives was evidence that the 
Act's primary purpose was 
confinement and therefore 
punitive. Id. at 2094. 
I n Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 
S. Ct. 2072 (1997), the Court gave 
deference to the Kansas 
legislature's stated intent for the 
Sexually Violent Predator Act and 
established a seemingly imposs-
ible standard of proof to challenge 
the "civil" label given to the Act. 
The Court refused to acknowledge 
a distinction between a "mental 
illness" and a "mental ab-
normality," even though Kansas' 
existing civil commitment statute 
required a finding of "mental 
illness." The Act was admittedly 
created in order to circumvent the 
inflexible definition of this term. 
The Act was designed to cover a 
person who commits sexual 
offenses as a result of a 
predisposition, and is likely to 
commit them again if released 
from prison. With this decision, 
the required proof of 
dangerousness in the civil 
commitment proceeding can be 
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met merely by offering a prediction 
of recidivism based only on the 
fact that the person committed a 
sex crime in the past and does not 
need to be based on a finding that 
the person is currently a danger. 
This case has provided the 
basis for a bill introduced in the 
Maryland General Assembly this 
session that would provide civil 
commitment as an option for 
detaining sex offenders. No doubt 
Maryland is the first of many 
states to follow the Kansas 
example. 
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would like to assist you with 
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release from prison. Id. at 2093. 
The dissent believed that the 
delay of treatment and the failure 
to consider less restrictive 
alternatives was evidence that the 
Act's primary purpose was 
confinement and therefore 
punitive. Id. at 2094. 
In Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 
S. Ct. 2072 (1997), the Court gave 
deference to the Kansas 
legislature's stated intent for the 
Sexually Violent Predator Act and 
established a seemingly imposs-
ible standard of proof to challenge 
the "civil" label given to the Act. 
The Court refused to acknowledge 
a distinction between a "mental 
illness" and a "mental ab-
normality," even though Kansas' 
existing civil commitment statute 
required a finding of "mental 
illness." The Act was admittedly 
created in order to circumvent the 
inflexible definition of this term. 
The Act was designed to cover a 
person who commits sexual 
offenses . as a result of a 
predisposition, and is likely to 
commit them again if released 
from prison. With this decision, 
the required Pro9f of 
dangerousness in the civil 
commitment proceeding can be 
met merely by offering a prediction 
of recidivism based only on the 
fact that the person committed a 
sex crime in the past and does not 
need to be based on a finding that 
the person is currently a danger. 
This case has provided the 
basis for a bill introduced in the 
Maryland General Assembly this 
session that would provide civil 
commitment as an option for 
detaining sex offenders. No doubt 
Maryland is the first of many 
states to follow the Kansas 
example. 
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